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Abstract
To preserve client privacy in the data mining process,
a variety of techniques based on random perturbation of
data records have been proposed recently. In this paper,
we present a generalized matrix-theoretic model of random
perturbation, which facilitates a systematic approach to the
design of perturbation mechanisms for privacy-preserving
mining. Specifically, we demonstrate that (a) the prior tech-
niques differ only in their settings for the model parame-
ters, and (b) through appropriate choice of parameter set-
tings, we can derive new perturbation techniques that pro-
vide highly accurate mining results even under strict pri-
vacy guarantees. We also propose a novel perturbation
mechanism wherein the model parameters are themselves
characterized as random variables, and demonstrate that
this feature provides significant improvements in privacy at
a very marginal cost in accuracy.
While our model is valid for random-perturbation-based
privacy-preserving mining in general, we specifically eval-
uate its utility here with regard to frequent-itemset mining
on a variety of real datasets. The experimental results indi-
cate that our mechanisms incur substantially lower identity
and support errors as compared to the prior techniques.
1. Introduction
The knowledge models produced through data mining
techniques are only as good as the accuracy of their input
data. One source of data inaccuracy is when users, due
to privacy concerns, deliberately provide wrong informa-
tion. This is especially common with regard to customers
asked to provide personal information on web forms to e-
commerce service providers.
The compulsion for doing so may be the (perhaps well-
founded) worry that the requested information may be mis-
used by the service provider to harass the customer. As a
case in point, consider a pharmaceutical company that asks
clients to disclose the diseases they have suffered from in or-
der to investigate the correlations in their occurrences – for
example, “Adult females with malarial infections are also
prone to contract tuberculosis”. While the company may
be acquiring the data solely for genuine data mining pur-
poses that would eventually reflect itself in better service to
the client, at the same time the client might worry that if
her medical records are either inadvertently or deliberately
disclosed, it may adversely affect her employment opportu-
nities.
To encourage users to submit correct inputs, a variety of
privacy-preserving data mining techniques have been pro-
posed in the last few years [3, 9, 12, 18, 23]. The goal of
these techniques is to keep the raw local data private but, at
the same time, support accurate reconstruction of the global
data mining models. Most of the techniques are based on
a data perturbation approach, wherein the user data is dis-
torted in a probabilistic manner that is disclosed to the even-
tual miner. For example, in the MASK technique [18],
intended for privacy-preserving association-rule mining on
sparse boolean databases, each 0 or 1 in the original user
transaction vector is flipped with a parametrized probability
1− p.
1.1. The FRAPP Framework
The trend in the prior literature has been to propose spe-
cific perturbation techniques, which are then analyzed for
their privacy and accuracy properties. We move on, in this
paper, to presenting FRAPP (FRamework for Accuracy in
Privacy-Preserving mining), a generalized matrix-theoretic
framework that facilitates a systematic approach to the de-
sign of random perturbation schemes for privacy-preserving
mining. While various privacy metrics have been discussed
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in the literature, FRAPP supports a particularly strong no-
tion of privacy, originally proposed in [13]. Specifically,
it supports a measure called “amplification”, which guar-
antees strict limits on privacy breaches of individual user
information, independent of the distribution of the original
data.
FRAPP quantitatively characterizes the sources of error
in random data perturbation and model reconstruction pro-
cesses. We first demonstrate that the prior techniques differ
only in their settings for the FRAPP parameters. Further,
and more importantly, we show that through appropriate
choice of parameter settings, new perturbation techniques
can be constructed that provide highly accurate mining re-
sults even under strict privacy guarantees. Efficient imple-
mentations for these new perturbation techniques are also
presented.
We investigate here, for the first time, the possibility of
randomizing the perturbation parameters themselves. The
motivation is that it could lead to an increase in privacy
levels since the exact parameter values used by a specific
client will not be known to the data miner. This scheme has
the obvious downside of perhaps reducing the model recon-
struction accuracy. However, our investigation shows that
the tradeoff is very attractive in that the privacy increase is
substantial whereas the accuracy reduction is only marginal.
This opens up the possibility of using FRAPP in a two-step
process: First, given a user-desired level of privacy, iden-
tifying the deterministic values of the FRAPP parameters
that both guarantee this privacy and also maximize the ac-
curacy; and then, (optionally) randomizing these parame-
ters to obtain even better privacy guarantees at a minimal
cost in accuracy.
The FRAPP model is valid for random-perturbation-
based privacy-preserving mining in general. Here, we fo-
cus on its applications to categorical databases, where the
domain of each attribute is finite. Note that boolean data
is a special case of this class, and further, that continuous-
valued attributes can be converted into categorical attributes
by partitioning the domain of the attribute into fixed length
intervals.
To quantitatively evaluate FRAPP’s utility, we specif-
ically evaluate the performance of our new perturbation
mechanisms on the popular mining task of finding frequent
itemsets, the cornerstone of association rule mining. Our
evaluation on a variety of real datasets shows that both iden-
tity and support errors are substantially lower than those in-
curred by the prior privacy-preserving techniques.
1.2. Contributions
In a nutshell, FRAPP provides a mathematical founda-
tion for “raising both the accuracy and privacy bars in strict
privacy-preserving mining”. Specifically, our main contri-
butions are as follows:
• FRAPP, a generalized matrix-theoretic framework for
random perturbation and mining model reconstruction;
• Using FRAPP to derive new perturbation mechanisms
for minimizing the model reconstruction error while
ensuring strict privacy guarantees;
• Introducing the concept of randomization of perturba-
tion parameters, and thereby deriving enhanced pri-
vacy;
• Efficient implementations of the perturbation tech-
niques for the proposed mechanisms;
• Quantitatively demonstrating the utility of our schemes
in the context of association rule mining.
1.3. Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The
FRAPP framework for data perturbation and model recon-
struction is presented in Section 2. Appropriate choices of
FRAPP parameters for simultaneously guaranteeing strict
data privacy and providing high model accuracy are dis-
cussed in Section 3. The impact of randomizing the FRAPP
parameters is investigated in Section 4. Efficient schemes
for implementing the new perturbation mechanisms are de-
scribed in Section 5. In Section 6, we discuss the applica-
tion of our mechanisms to association rule mining. Then,
in Section 7, the utility of FRAPP in the context of associa-
tion rule mining is quantitatively investigated. Related work
on privacy-preserving mining is reviewed in Section 8. Fi-
nally, in Section 9, we summarize the conclusions of our
study and outline future research avenues.
2. The FRAPP Framework
In this section, we describe the construction of the
FRAPP framework, and its quantification of privacy and ac-
curacy measures.
Data Model. We assume that the original databaseU con-
sists of N records, with each record having M categori-
cal attributes. The domain of attribute j is denoted by SjU ,
resulting in the domain SU of a record in U being given
by SU =
∏M
j=1
SjU . We map the domain SU to index set
IU = {1, . . . , |SU |}, so that we can model the database as
set of N values from IU . Thus, if we denote ith record of
U as Ui, we have
U = {Ui}
N
i=1, Ui ∈ IU
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Perturbation Model We consider the privacy situation
wherein the customers trust no one except themselves, that
is, they wish to perturb their records at their client site be-
fore the information is sent to the the miner, or any interme-
diate party. This means that perturbation is done at the level
of individual customer recordsUi, without being influenced
by the contents of the other records in the database.
For this situation, there are two possibilities: a simple in-
dependent column perturbation, wherein the value of each
attribute in the record is perturbed independently of the
rest, or a more generalized dependent column perturbation,
where the perturbation of each column may be affected by
the perturbations of the other columns in the record. Most
of the prior perturbation techniques, including [12, 13, 18],
fall into the independent column perturbation category. The
FRAPP framework, however, includes both kinds of pertur-
bation in its analysis.
Let the perturbed database be V = {V1, . . . , VN}, with
domain SV , and corresponding index set IV . For each orig-
inal customer record Ui = u, u ∈ IU , a new perturbed
record Vi = v, v ∈ IV is randomly generated with proba-
bility p(u→ v). Let A denote the matrix of these transition
probabilities, with Avu = p(u → v). This random process
maps to a Markov process, and the perturbation matrix A
should therefore satisfy the following properties [22]:∑
v∈IV
Avu = 1 ∀u ∈ IU
Avu ≥ 0 ∀u ∈ IU , v ∈ IV (1)
Due to the constraints imposed by Equation 1, the domain
of A is not R|SU |×|SV | but a subset of it. This domain is
further restricted by the choice of perturbation method. For
example, for the MASK technique [18] mentioned in the
Introduction, all the entries of matrix A are decided by the
choice of the single parameter p.
In this paper, we propose to explore the preferred choices
of A to simultaneously achieve privacy guarantees and high
accuracy, without restricting ourselves ab initio to a partic-
ular perturbation method.
2.1. Privacy Guarantees
The miner receives the perturbed database V and at-
tempts to reconstruct the original probability distribution of
database U using this perturbed data and the knowledge of
the perturbation matrix A.
The prior probability of a property of a customer’s pri-
vate information is the likelihood of the property in the ab-
sence of any knowledge about the customer’s private infor-
mation. On the other hand, the posterior probability is the
likelihood of the property given the perturbed information
from the customer and the knowledge of the prior proba-
bilities through reconstruction from the perturbed database.
As discussed in [13], in order to preserve the privacy of
some property of a customer’s private information, we de-
sire that the posterior probability of that property should not
be much higher than the prior probability of the property for
the customer. This is quantified by saying that a perturba-
tion method has privacy guarantees (ρ1, ρ2) if, for any prop-
erty Q(Ui) with prior probability less than ρ1, the posterior
probability of the property is guaranteed to be less than ρ2.
For our formulation, we derive (using Definition 3 and
Statement 1 from [13]) the following condition on the per-
turbation matrix A in order to support (ρ1, ρ2) privacy.
Avu1
Avu2
≤ γ ≤
ρ2(1− ρ1)
ρ1(1− ρ2)
u1, u2 ∈ IU , ∀v ∈ IV (2)
That is, the choice of perturbation matrix A should follow
the restriction that the ratio of any two entries should not be
more than γ.
2.2. Reconstruction Model
We now analyze how the distribution of the original
database can be reconstructed from the perturbed database.
As per the perturbation model, a client Ci with data record
Ui = u, u ∈ IU generates record Vi = v, v ∈ IV
with probability p[u → v]. This event of generation of v
can be viewed as a Bernoulli trial with success probability
p[u → v]. If we denote outcome of ith Bernoulli trial by
random variable Y iv , then the total number of successes Yv
in N trials is given by sum of the N Bernoulli random vari-
ables. i.e.
Yv =
N∑
i=1
Y iv (3)
That is, the total number of records with value v in the per-
turbed database will be given by the total number of suc-
cesses Yv .
Note that Yv is the sum of N independent but non-
identical Bernoulli trials. The trials are non-identical be-
cause the probability of success in a trial i varies from an-
other trial j and actually depends on the values of Ui and
Uj , respectively. The distribution of such a random variable
Yv is known as the Poisson-Binomial distribution [25].
Now, from Equation 3, the expectation of Yv is given by
E(Yv) =
N∑
i=1
E(Y iv ) =
N∑
i=1
P (Y iv = 1) (4)
Let Xu denote the number of records with
value u in the original database. Since
P (Y iv = 1) = p[u→ v] = Avu, for Ui = u, we get
E(Yv) =
∑
u∈IU
AvuXu (5)
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Let X = [X1X2 · · ·X|SU |]T , Y = [Y1Y2 · · ·Y|SV |]T , then
from Equation 5 we get
E(Y ) = AX (6)
We estimate X as X̂ given by the solution of following
equation
Y = AX̂ (7)
which is an approximation to Equation 6. This is a system
of |SV | equations in |SU | unknowns. For the system to be
uniquely solvable, a necessary condition is that the space of
the perturbed database is larger than or equal to the original
database (i.e. |SV | ≥ |SU |). Further, if the inverse of matrix
A exists, then we can find the solution of above system of
equations by
X̂ = A−1Y (8)
That is, Equation 8 gives the estimate of the distribution of
records in the original database, which is the objective of
the reconstruction exercise.
2.3. Estimation Error
To analyze the error in the above estimation process,
we use the following well-known theorem from linear
algebra [22]:
Theorem 1: For an equation of form Ax = b, the
relative error in solution x = A−1b satisfies
‖ δx ‖
‖ x ‖
≤ c
‖ δb ‖
‖ b ‖
where c is the condition number of matrix A. For a positive
definite matrix, c = λmax/λmin, where λmax and λmin are
the maximum and minimum eigen values of n × n matrix
A. Informally, the condition number is a measure of stabil-
ity or sensitivity of a matrix to numerical operations. Ma-
trices with condition numbers near one are said to be well-
conditioned, whereas those with condition numbers much
greater than one (e.g. 105 for a 5∗5 Hilbert matrix [22]) are
said to be ill-conditioned.
From Equations 6, 8 and the above theorem, we have
‖ X̂ −X ‖
‖ X ‖
≤ c
‖ Y − E(Y ) ‖
‖ E(Y ) ‖
(9)
This inequality means that the error in estimation arises
from two sources: First, the sensitivity of the problem
which is measured by the condition number of matrix A;
and, second, the deviation of Y from its mean as measured
by the variance of Y .
As discussed above,Yv is a Poisson-Binomial distributed
random variable. Hence, using the expression for variance
of a Poisson-Binomial random variable [25], we can com-
pute the variance of Yv to be
V ar(Yv) = AvX(1−
1
N
AvX)
−
∑
u∈IU
(Avu −
1
N
AvX)
2Xu (10)
which depends on the perturbation matrix A and the dis-
tribution X of records in the original database. Thus the
effectiveness of the privacy preserving method is critically
dependent on the choice of matrix A.
3. Choice of Perturbation Matrix
The various perturbation techniques proposed in the lit-
erature primarily differ in their choice for perturbation ma-
trix A. For example,
• MASK [18] uses the matrix A with
Avu = p
k(1 − p)Mb−k (11)
where k is the number of attributes with matching val-
ues in perturbed value v and original value u, Mb is the
number of boolean attributes when each categorical at-
tribute j is converted into | SjU | boolean attributes, and
1− p is the value flipping probability.
• The cut-and-paste randomization operator [12] em-
ploys a matrix A with
Avu =
M∑
z=0
pM [z]
min{z,lu,lv}∑
q=max{0,z+lu−M,lu+lv−Mb}
(
lu
q
)(
M−lu
z−q
)(
M
z
)
·
(
Mb − lu
lv − q
)
ρ(lv−q)(1− ρ)(Mb−lu−lv+q)
where (12)
pM [z] =
min{K,z}∑
w=0
(
M −w
z − w
)
ρ(z−w)(1− ρ)(M−z)
·
{
1−M/(K + 1) if w = M and w < K
1/(K + 1) o.w.
Here lu and lv are the number of 1s in the original
record u and its corresponding perturbed record v, re-
spectively, while K and ρ are operator parameters.
For enforcing strict privacy guarantees, the parameters
for the above methods are decided by the constraints on
the values of perturbation matrix A given in Equation 2. It
turns out that for practical values of privacy requirements,
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the resulting matrix A for these schemes is extremely ill-
conditioned – in fact, we found the condition numbers in
our experiments to be of the order of 105 and 107 for MASK
and the Cut-and-Paste operator, respectively.
Such ill-conditioned matrices make the reconstruction
very sensitive to the variance in the distribution of the
perturbed database. Thus, it is important to carefully
choose the matrix A such that it is well-conditioned (i.e
has a low condition number). If we decide on a distortion
method apriori, as in the prior techniques, then there is little
room for making specific choices of perturbation matrix A.
Therefore, we take the opposite approach of first designing
matrices of the required type, and then devising perturba-
tion methods that are compatible with the chosen matrices.
To choose the appropriate matrix, we start from the intu-
ition that for γ = ∞, the matrix choice would be the unity
matrix, which satisfies the constraints on matrix A imposed
by Equations 1 and 2, and has condition number 1. Hence,
for a given γ, we can choose the following matrix:
Aij =
{
γx, if i = j
x, o.w.
where
x =
1
γ + (|SU | − 1)
(13)
This matrix will be of the form
x

γ 1 1 . . .
1 γ 1 . . .
1 1 γ . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

It is easy to see that the above matrix, which incidentally
is a symmetric Toeplitz matrix [22], satisfies the conditions
given by Equations 1 and 2. Further, its condition number
can be computed to be 1+ |SU |γ−1 , For ease of exposition, we
will hereafter refer to this matrix informally as the “gamma-
diagonal matrix”.
At this point, an obvious question is whether it is possi-
ble to design matrices that have even lower condition num-
ber than the gamma-diagonal matrix. In the remainder of
this section, we prove that within the constraints of our
problem, the gamma-diagonal matrix has the lowest possi-
ble condition number, that is, it is an optimal choice (albeit
non-unique).
Proof. To prove this, we will first derive the expression
for minimum condition number for such matrices and the
conditions under which that condition number is achieved.
Then we show that our gamma-diagonal matrix satisfies
these conditions, and has minimum condition number.
For a symmetric positive definite matrix, the condition
number is given by
c =
λmax
λmin
(14)
where λmax and λmin are the maximum and minimum
eigenvalues of the matrix. As the matrix A is a Markov
matrix (refer Equation 1), the following theorem for
eigenvalues of a matrix can be used
Theorem 2 [22] For an n× n Markov matrix,
• 1 is an eigenvalue
• the other eigenvalues satisfy | λi |≤ 1
Theorem 3 [22] The sum of n eigenvalues equals the sum
of n diagonal entries:
λ1 + · · ·+ λn = A11 + · · ·+Ann
Using Theorem 2 we get,
λmax = 1
As the least eigenvalue λmin will always be less than or
equal to average of the eigenvalues other than λmax, we
get,
λmin ≤
1
n− 1
n∑
i=2
λi
where λ1 = λmax Using Theorem 3,
λmin ≤
1
n− 1
(
n∑
i=1
Aii − 1
)
, (15)
Hence, condition number,
c =
1
λmin
≥
n− 1∑n
i=1Aii − 1
(16)
Now, due to privacy constraints on A given by Equation 2,
Aii ≤ γAij for any j 6= i,
i.e.,
Aii ≤ γAi1
Aii ≤ γAi2
.
.
.
Summing above,
(n− 1)Aii ≤ γ
∑
j 6=i
Aij
= γ(1− Aii)
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where the last step is due to the condition on A given by
Equation 1. Solving for Aii, we get,
Aii ≤
γ
γ + n− 1
(17)
Using above inequality in Equation 16, we get
c ≥
n− 1
nγ
γ+n−1 − 1
=
γ + n− 1
γ − 1
(18)
Hence minimum condition number for the symmetric
perturbation matrices under privacy constraints represented
by γ is γ+n−1γ−1 . This condition number is achieved when
Aii =
γ
γ+n−1 .
The diagonal values of gamma-diagonal matrix given by
Equation 1 is γγ+n−1 . Thus it is minimum condition num-
ber symmetric perturbation matrix, with condition number
γ+|SU |−1
γ−1 .
4. Randomizing the Perturbation Matrix
The estimation model in the previous section implic-
itly assumed the perturbation matrix A to be deterministic.
However, it appears intuitive that if the perturbation matrix
parameters are themselves randomized, so that each client
uses a perturbation matrix that is not specifically known to
the miner, the privacy of the client will be further increased.
Of course, it may also happen that the reconstruction accu-
racy may suffer in this process.
In this section, we explore this tradeoff. Instead of de-
terministic matrix A, the perturbation matrix here is matrix
A˜ of random variables, where each entry A˜vu is a random
vaiable with E(A˜vu) = Avu. The values taken by the ran-
dom variables for a client Ci provide the specific values for
his/her perturbation matrix.
4.1. Privacy Guarantees
Let Q(Ui) be a property of client Ci’s private informa-
tion, and let record Ui = u be perturbed to Vi = v. Denote
the prior probability of Q(Ui) by P (Q(Ui)). On seeing the
perturbed data, the posterior probability of the property is
calculated to be:
P (Q(Ui)|Vi = v) =
∑
Q(u)
PUi|Vi(u|v)
=
∑
Q(u)
PUi(u)PVi|Ui(v|u)
PVi(v)
When we use a fixed perturbation matrix A for all clients i,
then PVi/Ui(v/u) = Avu, ∀i. Hence
P (Q(Ui)|Vi = v) =
∑
Q(u) PUi(u)Avu∑
Q(u) PUi(u)Avu +
∑
¬Q(u) PUi(u)Avu
As discussed in [13], the data distribution PUi in the
worst case can be such that P (Ui = u) > 0 only if
{u ∈ IU |Q(u) and Avu = maxp}
or
{u ∈ IU |¬Q(u) and Avu = minp},
so that
P (Q(Ui)/Vi = v) =
P (Q(u)) ·maxp
P (Q(u)) ·maxp+ P (¬Q(u)) ·minp
where maxp = maxQ(u′)Avu′ and minp = min¬Q(u′)Avu′ .
Since the distribution PU is known through reconstruc-
tion to the miner, and matrix A is fixed, the above poste-
rior probability can be determined by the miner. For ex-
ample, if P (Q(u)) = 5%, γ = 19, the posterior probabil-
ity can be computed to be 50% for perturbation with the
gamma-diagonal matrix.
But, in the randomized matrix case wherePVi/Ui(v/u) is
a realization of random variable A˜, only its distribution and
not the exact value for a given i is known to the miner. Thus
determinations like the above cannot be made by the miner
for a given record Ui. For example, suppose we choose
matrix A such that
Auv =
{
γx+ r, if u = v
x− r|SU |−1 , o.w.
where x = 1γ+(|SU |−1) and r is a random variable uniformly
distributed between [−α, α]. Thus, the worst case posterior
probability for a record Ui is now a function of the value of
r, and is given by
ρ2(r) =
P (Q(u)) · γx+ r
P (Q(u)) · (γx+ r) + P (¬Q(u))(x− r
|SU |−1
)
Therefore, only the posterior probability range, i.e.
[ρ−2 , ρ
+
2 ] = [ρ2(−α), ρ2(+α)], and the distribution over the
range, can be determined by the miner. For example,
for the situationP (Q(u)) = 5%, γ = 19, α = γx/2, he can
only say that the posterior probability lies in the range
[33%, 60%] with its probability of being greater than 50%
(ρ2 corresponding to r = 0) equal to its probability of being
less than 50%.
4.2. Reconstruction Model
The reconstruction model for the deterministic perturba-
tion matrix A was discussed in Section 2.2. We now de-
scribe the changes to this analysis for the randomized per-
turbation matrix A˜.
The probability of success for Bernoulli variable Y iv is now
modified to
P (Y iv = 1) = A˜
i
vu, for Ui = u
where A˜ivu denotes the ith realization of random variable
A˜vu.
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Thus, from Equation 4,
E(Yv) =
N∑
i=1
P (Y iv = 1)
=
∑
u∈IU
∑
{i|Ui=u}
A˜ivu
=
∑
u∈IU
AvuXu (19)
⇒ E(Y ) = AvuX (20)
where Avu = 1Xu
∑
{i|Ui=u}
A˜ivu is the average of the val-
ues taken by A˜vu for the clients whose original data record
had value u.
A˜vu is a random variable with expectation
E(A˜vu) = Avu, it can be easily seen that,
E(Avu) = Avu (21)
Hence, from Equation 19, we get
E(E(Y )) = AX (22)
We estimate X as X̂ given by the solution of following
equation
Y = AX̂ (23)
which is an approximation to Equation 22. From Theorem 1
in Section 2.2, the error in estimation is bounded by:
‖ X̂ −X ‖
‖ X ‖
≤ c
‖ Y − E(E(Y )) ‖
‖ E(E(Y )) ‖
(24)
where c is the condition number of perturbation matrix A.
We now compare these bounds with the corresponding
bounds of the deterministic case. Firstly, note that, due to
the use of the randomized matrix, there is a double expec-
tation for Y on the RHS of the inequality, as opposed to
the single expectation in the deterministic case. Secondly,
only the numerator is different between the two cases since
E(E(Y )) = AX . Now, we have
‖ Y − E(E(Y )) ‖
= ‖ (Y − E(Y )) + (E(Y )−E(E(Y ))) ‖
≤ ‖ Y − E(Y ) ‖ + ‖ E(Y )− E(E(Y )) ‖
Here ‖ Y −E(Y ) ‖ is given by the variance of random vari-
able Y . Since Yv, as discussed before, is Poisson-binomial
distributed, its variance is given by [25]
V ar(Yv) = Npv −
∑
i
(piv)
2 (25)
where pv = 1N
∑
i p
i
v and piv = P (Y iv = 1).
It is easily seen (by elementary calculus or induction)
that among all combinations {piv} such that
∑
i p
i
v = npv ,
the sum
∑
i (p
i
v)
2 assumes its minimum value when all piv
are equal. It follows that, if the average probability of suc-
cess pv is kept constant, V ar(Yv) assumes its maximum
value when p1v = · · · = pNv . In other words, the variability
of piv , or its lack of uniformity, decreases the magnitude of
chance fluctuations, as measured by its variance [14]. On
using random matrix A˜ instead of deterministic A we in-
crease the variability of piv (now piv assumes variable values
for all i), hence decreasing the fluctuation of Yv from its
expectation, as measured by its variance.
Hence, ‖ Y − E(Y ) ‖ is likely to be decreased as com-
pared to the deterministic case, thereby reducing the er-
ror bound. On the other hand, the positive value
‖ E(Y )− E(E(Y )) ‖=‖ (A− A)X ‖, which depends upon
the variance of the random variables in A˜, was 0 in the de-
terministic case. Thus, the error bound is increased by this
term.
So, we have a classic tradeoff situation here, and as
shown later in our experiments of Section 7, the tradeoff
turns out very much in our favour with the two opposing
terms almost canceling each other out, making the error
only marginally worse than the deterministic case.
5. Implementation of Perturbation Algorithm
To implement the perturbation process discussed in the
previous sections, we effectively need to generate for each
Ui = u, a discrete distribution with PMF P (v) = Avu and
CDF F (v) =
∑
i≤v Aiu, defined over v = 1, . . . , | SV |.
A straightforward algorithm for generating the perturbed
record v from the original record u is the following
1. Generate r ∼ U(0, 1)
2. Repeat for v = 1, . . . , | SV |
if F (v − 1) < r ≤ F (v)
return Vi = v
where U(0, 1) denotes uniform distribtion over range [0, 1]
This algorithm, whose complexity is proportional to the
product of the cardinalities of the attribute domains, will re-
quire | SV | /2 iterations on average which can turn out to
be very large. For example, with 31 attributes, each with
two categories, this amounts to 230 iterations for each cus-
tomer! We therefore present below an alternative algorithm
whose complexity is proportional to the sum of the cardi-
nality of the attribute domains.
Given that we want to perturb the record Ui = u, we can
write
P (Vi;Ui = u)
= P (Vi1, . . . , ViM ;u)
= P (Vi1;u) · P (Vi2|Vi1;u) · · ·P (ViM |Vi1, . . . , Vi(M−1);u)
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For the perturbation matrix A, we get the following ex-
pressions for the above probabilities:
P (Vi1 = a;u) =
∑
{v|v(1)=a}
Avu
P (Vi2 = b|Vi1 = a;u) =
P (Vi2 = b, Vi1 = a;u)
P (Vi1 = a);u
=
∑
{v|v(1)=a&v(2)=b} Avu
P (Vi1 = a;u)
. . . and so on
where v(i) denotes value of ith column for record value =v.
For the gamma-diagonal matrix A, and using nj to rep-
resent
∏j
k=1 | S
k
U |, we get the following expressions for
these probabilities after some simple algebraic calculations:
P (Vi1 = b;Ui1 = b) = (γ +
nM
n1
− 1)x
P (Vi1 = b;Ui1 6= b) =
nM
n1
x
Then, for the jth attribute
P (Vij/Vi1, . . . , Vi(j−1);Ui)
=

(γ+
nM
nj
−1)x∏ j−1
k=1
pk
, if ∀k ≤ j, Vik = Uik
(
nM
nj
)x∏j−1
k=1
pk
, o.w.
(26)
where pk is the probability that Vik takes value a, given that
a is the outcome of the random process performed for kth
attribute. i.e.
pk = P (Vik = a/Vi1, . . . , Vi(k−1);Ui)
Therefore, to achieve the desired random perturbation
for a value in column j, we use as input both its original
value and the perturbed value of the previous column j− 1,
and generate the perturbed value as per the discrete distri-
bution given in Equation 26. Note that is an example of de-
pendent column perturbation, in contrast to the independent
column perturbation used in most of the prior techniques.
To assess the complexity, it is easy to see that the average
number of iterations for the jth discrete distribution will
be |SjU |/2, and hence the average number of iterations for
generating a perturbed record will be
∑
j |S
j
U |/2 (this value
turns out to be exactly M for a boolean database).
6. Application to Association Rule Mining
To illustrate the utility of the FRAPP framework, we
demonstrate in this section how it can be used for enhanc-
ing privacy-preserving mining of association rules, a popu-
lar mining model that identifies interesting correlations be-
tween database attributes [1, 21].
The core of the association rule mining is to identify
“frequent itemsets”, that is, all those itemsets whose sup-
port (i.e. frequency) in the database is in excess of a user-
specified threshold. Equation 8 can be directly used to es-
timate the support of itemsets containing all M categorical
attributes. However, in order to incorporate the reconstruc-
tion procedure into bottom-up association rule mining al-
gorithms such as Apriori [2], we need to also be able to
estimate the supports of itemsets consisting of only a subset
of attributes.
Let C denotes the set of all attributes in the database,
and Cs be a subset of attributes. Each of the attributes
j ∈ Cs can assume one of the |SjU | values. Thus, the
number of itemsets over attributes in Cs is given by nCs =∏
j∈Cs
|SjU |. Let L,H denote itemsets over this subset of
attributes.
We say that record supports an itemset L over Cs if the
entries in the record for the attributes j ∈ Cs are same as in
L.
Let support of an itemset L in original and distorted
database be denoted by supUL and supVL , respectively. Then,
supVL =
1
N
∑
v supportsL
Yv
where Yv denotes the number of records in V with value v
(refer Section 2.2). From Equation 7, we know
Yv =
∑
u∈IU
AvuX̂u (27)
Hence,
supVL =
1
N
∑
v supportsL
∑
u
AvuX̂u
=
1
N
∑
u
X̂u
∑
v supportsL
Avu
=
1
N
∑
H
∑
u supportsH
X̂u
∑
v supportsL
Avu
If for all u which support a given itemset H,∑
v supportsLAvu = AHL, i.e. it is equal for all u which
support a given itemset, then the above equation can be
written as:
supVL =
1
N
∑
H
AHL
∑
u supportsH
X̂u
=
∑
H
AHL ŝupUH
Now we find the matrix A for our gamma-diagonal ma-
trix. Through some simple algebra, we get following matrix
A corresponding to itemsets over subset Cs, Hence,
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AHL =
{
γx+ ( nCnCs
− 1)x, if H = L
nC
nCs
x, o.w.
(28)
Using the above nCs × nCs matrix we can estimate sup-
port of itemsets over any subset Cs of attributes. Thus our
scheme can be implemented on popular bottom-up associa-
tion rule mining algorithms.
7. Performance Analysis
We move on, in this section, to quantify the utility of the
FRAPP framework with respect to the privacy and accuracy
levels that it can provide for mining frequent itemsets.
Datasets. We use the following real world datasets in our
experiments:
CENSUS : This dataset contains census information for
approximately 50,000 adult American citizens. It is
available from the UCI repository [26], and is a popu-
lar benchmark in data mining studies. It is also repre-
sentative of a database where there are fields that users
may prefer to keep private – for example, the “race”
and “sex” attributes. We use three continuous (age,
fnlwgt, hours-per-week) and three nominal
attributes (native-country, sex, race) from
the census database in our experiments. The continu-
ous attributes are partitioned into (five) equiwidth in-
tervals to convert them into categorical attributes. The
categories used for each attribute are listed in Table 1.
HEALTH : This dataset captures health information for
over 100,000 patients collected by the US government
[27]. We selected 3 continuous and 4 nominal at-
tributes from the dataset for our experiments. The con-
tinuous attributes were partitioned into equi-width in-
tervals to convert them into categorical attributes. The
attributes and their categories are listed in Table 2.
We evaluated the association rule mining accuracy of our
schemes on the above datasets for supmin = 2%. Table 3
gives the number of frequent itemsets in the datasets for
supmin = 2%.
Table 3. Frequent Itemsets for supmin = 0.02
Itemset Length
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CENSUS 19 102 203 165 64 10 –
HEALTH 23 123 292 361 250 86 12
Privacy Metric. The (ρ1, ρ2) strict privacy measure from
[13] is used as the privacy metric. While we experimented
with a variety of privacy settings, due to space limitations,
we present results here for a sample (ρ1, ρ2) = (5%, 50%),
which was also used in [13]. This privacy value results in
γ = 19.
Accuracy Metrics. We evaluate two kinds of mining er-
rors, Support Error and Identity Error, in our experiments:
Support Error (ρ) This metric reflects the (percentage)
average relative error in the reconstructed support val-
ues for those itemsets that are correctly identified to be
frequent. Denoting the number of frequent itemsets by
|F |, the reconstructed support by ŝup and the actual
support by sup, the support error is computed over all
frequent itemsets as
ρ =
1
| F |
Σf∈F
| ŝupf − supf |
supf
∗ 100
Identity Error (σ) This metric reflects the percentage er-
ror in identifying frequent itemsets and has two com-
ponents: σ+, indicating the percentage of false posi-
tives, and σ− indicating the percentage of false nega-
tives. Denoting the reconstructed set of frequent item-
sets with R and the correct set of frequent itemsets
with F , these metrics are computed as:
σ+ = |R−F ||F | ∗ 100 σ
− = |F−R||F | * 100
Perturbation Mechanisms. We show frequent-itemset-
mining accuracy results for our proposed perturbation
mechanisms as well as representative prior techniques. For
all the perturbation mechanisms, the mining from the dis-
torted database was done using Apriori [2] algorithm, with
an additional support reconstruction phase at the end of each
pass to recover the original supports from the perturbed
database supports computed during the pass [18, 8].
The perturbation mechanisms evaluated in our study are
the following:
DET-GD: This schemes uses the deterministic gamma-
diagonal perturbation matrix A (Section 3) for per-
turbation and reconstruction. The implementation de-
scribed in Section 5 was used to carry out the perturba-
tion, and the results of Section 6 were used to compute
the perturbation matrix used in each pass of Apriori for
reconstruction.
RAN-GD: This scheme uses the randomized gamma-
diagonal perturbation matrix A˜ (Section 4) for pertur-
bation and reconstruction. Though in general, any dis-
tribution can be used for A˜, here we evaluate the per-
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Table 1. CENSUS Dataset
Attribute Categories
age (15− 35], (35− 55], (55− 75], > 75
fnlwgt (0− 1e5], (1e5− 2e5], (1e5− 3e5], (3e5− 4e5], > 4e5
hours-per-week (0− 20], (20− 40], (40− 60], (60− 80], > 80
race White, Asian-Pac-Islander, Amer-Indian-Eskimo, Other, Black
sex Female, Male
native-country United-States, Other
Table 2. HEALTH Dataset
Attribute Categories
AGE (Age) [0− 20), [20− 40), [40− 60), [60− 80),≥ 80)
BDDAY12 (Bed days in past 12 months) [0− 7), [7− 15), [15 − 30), [30− 60),≥ 60
DV12 (Doctor visits in past 12 months) [0− 7), [7− 15), [15 − 30), [30− 60),≥ 60
PHONE (Has Telephone) Yes,phone number given; Yes, no phone number given; No
SEX (Sex) Male ; Female
INCFAM20 (Family Income) Less than $20,000; $20,000 or more
HEALTH (Health status) Excellent; Very Good; Good; Fair; Poor
formance of uniformly distributed A˜ given by Equa-
tion 19 over the entire range of the randomization pa-
rameter α.
MASK: This is the perturbation scheme proposed in [18],
which is intended for boolean databases and is charac-
terized by a single parameter 1 − p, which determines
the probability of an attribute value being flipped. In
our scenario, the categorical attributes are mapped to
boolean attributes by making each value of the cate-
gory an attribute. Thus, the M categorical attributes
map to Mb =
∑
j | S
j
U | boolean attributes.
The flipping probability 1 − p was chosen as the low-
est value which could satisfy the constraints given by
Equation 2. The constraint ∀v : ∀u1, u2 :
Avu1
Avu2
≤ γ
is satisfied for MASK [18], if p
Mb
(1 − p)Mb
≤ γ. But,
for each categorical attribute, one and only one of its
associated boolean attributes takes value 1 in a partic-
ular record. Therefore, all the records contain exactly
M 1s, and the following condition is sufficient for the
privacy constraints to be satisfied:
p2M
(1− p)2M
≤ γ
. This equation was used to determine the appropriate
value of p. Value of p turns out be 0.5610 and 0.5524
respectively for CENSUS and HEALTH datasets for
γ = 19.
C&P: This is the Cut-and-Paste perturbation scheme pro-
posed in [12], with algorithmic parameters K and ρ.
To choose K , we varied K from 0 to M , and for
each K , ρ was chosen such that the matrix (Equa-
tion 12) satisfies the privacy constraints (Equation 2).
The results reported here are for the (K, ρ) combina-
tion giving the best mining accuracy. For γ = 19
K = 3, ρ = 0.494 turn out to be appropriate values.
7.1. Experimental Results
For the CENSUS dataset, the support (ρ) and identity
(σ−, σ+) errors of the four perturbation mechanisms (DET-
GD, RAN-GD, MASK, C&P) is shown in Figure 1, as a
function of the length of the frequent itemsets. The cor-
responding graphs for the HEALTH dataset are shown in
Figure 2. In this graph for comparison, the performance of
RAN-GD is shown for randomization parameter α = γx/2.
Note that the support error (ρ) is plotted on a log-scale.
In these figures, we first note that the performance of the
DET-GD method is visibly better than that of MASK and
C&P. In fact, as the length of the frequent itemset increases,
the performance of both MASK and C&P degrades drasti-
cally. MASK is not able to find any itemsets of length above
4 for the CENSUS dataset, and above 5 for the HEALTH
dataset, while C&P does not works after 3-length itemsets.
The second point to note is that the accuracy of RAN-
GD, although dealing with a randomized matrix, is only
marginally lower than that of DET-GD. In return, it pro-
vides a substantial increase in the privacy – its worst case
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(determinable) privacy breach is only 33% as compared to
50% with DET-GD. Figure 3 shows performance of RAN-
GD over entire range of α, and the posterior probability
range [ρ−, ρ+]. It shows mining support reconstruction er-
rors for itemset length 4. We can observe that the perfor-
mance of RAN-GD does not deviate much from the derter-
ministic case over the entire range, where as very low de-
terminable posterior probability can be obtained for higher
values of α.
The primary reason for DET-GD and RAN-GD’s good
performance is the low condition number of their pertur-
bation matrices. This is quantitatively shown in Figure 4,
which compares the condition numbers (on a log-scale) of
the reconstruction matrices. Note that as the expected value
of random matrix A˜ is used for estimation in RAN-GD,
and the random matrix used in experiments has expected
value A (refer Equation 19) used in DET-GD, the condition
numbers for two methods are equal. Here we see that the
condition number for DET-GD and RAN-GD is not only
low but also constant over all lengths of frequent item-
sets (as mentioned before, the condition number is equal
to 1 + |SU |)(γ−1) ). In marked contrast, the condition number
for MASK and C&P increase exponentially with increasing
itemset length, resulting in drastic degradation in accuracy.
Thus our choice of a gamma-diagonal matrix shows highly
promising results for discovery of long patterns.
8. Related Work
The issue of maintaining privacy in data mining has at-
tracted considerable attention in the recent past.
The work closest to our approach is that of [3, 7, 12,
18, 13]. In the pioneering work of [3], privacy-preserving
data classifiers based on adding noise to the record values
were proposed. This work was extended in [7] and [16] to
address a variety of subtle privacy loopholes.
New randomization operators for maintaining data pri-
vacy for boolean data were presented and analyzed in
[12, 18]. These methods are for categorical/boolean data
and are based on probabilistic mapping from domain space
to the range space rather than by incorporating additive
noise to continuous valued data. A theoretical formulation
of privacy breaches for such methods and a methodology
for limiting them were given in the foundational work of
[13].
Our work is directly related to the above-mentioned
methodologies for privacy preserving mining. We combine
the approaches for random perturbation on categorical data
into a common theoretical framework, and explore how well
random perturbation methods can do in the face of strict
privacy requirements. We show that we can derive a pertur-
bation matrix which performs significantly better than the
existing methods for discovery of frequent itemsets in cat-
egorical data while simultaneously ensuring strict privacy
guarantees. Also, we propose the novel idea of making the
perturbation matrix itself random which, to the best of our
knowledge, has not been previously explored in the context
of privacy preserving mining.
Another model of privacy preserving data mining is k-
anonymity model [23]. The perturbation approach used in
random perturbation model works under the strong privacy
requirement that even the dataset forming server is not al-
lowed to learn or recover precise records. Users trust no-
body and perturb their record at their end before providing it
to any other party. k-anonymity model[23] does not satisfy
this requirements. The condensation approach discussed in
[9] also requires the relaxation of the assumption that even
the data forming server is not allowed to learn or recover
records, as in k-anonymity model. Hence these models are
orthogonal to our privacy model.
[6, 4, 17, 5] deal with Hippocratic databases which are
the database systems that take responsibility of the privacy
of data they manage. It involves specification of how the
data is to be used in a privacy policy and enforcing limited
disclosure rules for regulatory concerns prompted by legis-
lation.
Finally, the problem addressed in [19, 10, 11, 20] is how
to prevent sensitive rules from being inferred by the data
miner – this work is complementary to ours since it ad-
dresses concerns about output privacy, whereas our focus
is on the privacy of the input data. Maintaining input data
privacy is considered in [24, 15, ?, ?] in the context of
databases that are distributed across a number of sites with
each site only willing to share data mining results, but not
the source data.
9. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we developed FRAPP, a generalized model
for random-perturbation-based methods operating on cate-
gorical data under strict privacy constraints. We showed
that by making careful choices of the model parameters
and building perturbation methods for these choices, order-
of-magnitude improvements in accuracy could be achieved
as compared to the conventional approach of first deciding
on a method and thereby implicitly fixing the associated
model parameters. In particular, we proved that a “gamma-
diagonal” perturbation matrix is capable of delivering the
best accuracy, and is in fact, optimal with respect to its
condition number. We presented an implementation tech-
nique for gamma-diagonal-based perturbation, whose com-
plexity is proportional to the sum of the domain cardinali-
ties of the attributes in the database. Empirical evaluation
of our new gamma-diagonal-based techniques on the CEN-
SUS and HEALTH datasets showed substantial reductions
in frequent itemset identity and support reconstruction er-
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Figure 4. Comparison of condition number of transition probability matrix (a) CENSUS (b) HEALTH
rors.
We also investigated the novel strategy of having the per-
turbation matrix composed of not values, but random vari-
ables instead. Our analysis of this approach showed that,
at a marginal cost in accuracy, signficant improvements in
privacy levels could be achieved.
In our future work, we plan to extend our modeling ap-
proach to other flavors of mining tasks.
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